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i 
CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES 
 
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a), counsel for Amici Service Employees 
International Union and Change to Win submits the following certificate as to 
parties, rulings, and related cases: 
A. Parties, amici, and intervenors 
 To the best of my knowledge, all parties, intervenors, and amici before the 
district court and in this court are listed in the Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants; the Brief for Appellees; the Amicus Brief of Law Professors Barry 
Friedman, Matthew Adler, et al.; and the Amicus Brief of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts; except for the following: 
The amici included in the Amicus Brief of the National Women’s Law 
Center et al. 
The amici listed in the Notice of Intent To File Amicus Curiae Brief by 
Economic Scholars 
B.  Rulings Under Review 
 References to the rulings at issue appear in the Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants. 
C. Related Cases 
 This case was never previously before this Court, or any other court, other 
than the district court from which this case has been appealed.  Amici Service 
Employees International Union and Change to Win are not aware of any cases 
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ii 
pending in this Court that involve the same parties or substantially the same issues, 
or any such cases previously before this Court.  References to other cases currently 
pending in other federal courts that involve the same or similar issues as this 
appeal are provided in the Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
 
 
Dated: July 5, 2011 
         /s/ Scott Kronland   
             Scott Kronland 
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iii 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Amicus curiae Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) is an 
international labor union with approximately 2.2 million members.  Amicus curiae 
Change to Win is a labor federation of four national and international labor unions 
– the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, United Farm Workers of America, 
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, and SEIU – which 
collectively represent 5.5 million working men and women throughout the United 
States.  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, SEIU and Change to 
Win state that they are not affiliated with any publicly owned corporation, nor do 
they have stock owned by a publicly owned company. 
 
Dated: July 5, 2011 
         /s/ Scott Kronland   
             Scott Kronland 
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iv 
CERTIFICATE IN SUPPORT OF SEPARATE BRIEF 
 
Pursuant to Circuit Rule 29(d), this separate brief is necessary because it 
establishes that the PPACA’s minimum coverage provision is an income tax, and 
as such, a constitutional exercise of Congress’ taxing authority.  This issue has not 
been fully addressed by the parties, and, to the best of the undersigned counsel’s 
knowledge, it will not be addressed by any other amici. 
 
Dated: July 5, 2011 
         /s/ Scott Kronland   
             Scott Kronland 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amicus curiae SEIU is the nation’s largest healthcare union, with more than 
half its 2.2 million members in the healthcare field.  SEIU supports the PPACA 
because it helps ensure accessible, quality healthcare for all Americans, including 
SEIU members and their families. 
Amicus curiae Change to Win is a federation of four labor unions – the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, United Farm Workers of America, United 
Food and Commercial Workers International Union, and SEIU – which 
collectively represent 5.5 million working men and women.  Change to Win is 
committed to achieving affordable healthcare for all workers and their families. 
The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.  No counsel for a party 
authored this brief in whole or in part and no person other than amici and their 
counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. 
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
All applicable statutes, etc., are contained in Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief and 
Appellees’ Brief. 
 
 
 
 
USCA Case #11-5047      Document #1316639      Filed: 07/05/2011      Page 15 of 48
  
2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The minimum coverage provision of the PPACA, 26 U.S.C. §5000A, is a 
proper exercise of Congress’ “complete and all-embracing taxing power.”  
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1916).  The provision taxes the 
income of individuals whose income exceeds the income tax filing thresholds, 
while exempting those who purchase health insurance coverage.  The tax 
represents a small portion of any individual’s income; is measured as a percentage 
of income (subject to a floor and ceiling); and is administered through the income 
tax collection system.  The tax generates substantial revenue that the federal 
government can use to address the cost of providing healthcare for taxpayers 
without adequate insurance, while creating an incentive for taxpayers to purchase 
affordable coverage, reducing future costs to the government. 
The Supreme Court already has upheld substantively indistinguishable 
exercises of Congress’ taxing power.  Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
548, 581 (1937) (“Steward”), and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937), 
held that the similarly structured Social Security Act was an exercise of Congress’ 
taxing power and a rational response to the national problems caused by the 
widespread lack of unemployment and old age insurance. 
The court below ruled that the minimum coverage provision could not be 
upheld as a tax because Congress invoked the Commerce Clause and used the label 
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“penalty,” evincing an intent to regulate.  This misconceives the proper analysis of 
this issue. 
First, whether an enactment is a valid exercise of the taxing power turns on 
its substance, not on Congress’ motives or choice of label.  See, e.g., Hampton & 
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462 (1866).  
Because the minimum coverage provision operates to tax income and lacks any 
“penalizing features” that are inconsistent with its characterization as a tax, Dep’t. 
of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994), it is within 
Congress’ powers of taxation – no matter what label Congress chose or what 
powers Congress believed validated it. 
Second, regulatory and revenue-generating purposes are not mutually 
exclusive; Congress validly exercises its taxing power even when its primary 
purpose is regulatory.  United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).   
Finally, Congress’ use of the label “penalty” is entirely consistent with an 
intent to tax.  E.g., 26 U.S.C. §1(f) (labeling certain income tax provisions 
“marriage penalty”). 
Plaintiffs argue that, for want of the word “tax,” one of the most significant 
pieces of legislation in the last 50 years must be overturned entirely.  This kind of 
“magic words” jurisprudence is not the law.  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 
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U.S. 298, 310 (1992).  The courts are charged with policing (and protecting) the 
substance of Congress’ authority, not invalidating legislation based on mere 
matters of form.   
There is no serious argument that the PPACA’s minimum coverage 
provision could not be accomplished through a differently labeled but 
substantively indistinguishable exercise of the taxing power.  Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs cannot reasonably contend that it exceeds any fundamental limits on 
Congress’ authority.  Rather, the PPACA’s opponents argue, in essence, that there 
is insufficient evidence of congressional motive that the provision be understood as 
an exercise of Congress’ taxing authority.  This is not only wrong on the facts; it is 
simply not the way congressional authority is analyzed.  Congress has ample 
authority to assess a tax on the income of those who decline to purchase health 
insurance.  That is what the PPACA does.  It should therefore be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Minimum Coverage Provision Operates As An Income Tax That 
Generates Revenue To Offset Healthcare Costs While Encouraging 
Taxpayers To Purchase Coverage, Further Safeguarding The Treasury 
The PPACA provision at issue here is part of a comprehensive reform 
package designed to improve the nation’s health and reduce the federal deficit.  
The provision requires “applicable individual[s]” to ensure that they and their 
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dependents have “minimum essential coverage,” or pay an assessment.  26 U.S.C. 
§5000A(a)-(b). 
In enacting the PPACA, Congress specifically noted that healthcare costs, 
including the costs of caring for the uninsured, significantly burden the federal 
budget.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. 1, at 1 (2010); id., pt. 2, at 983.  The 
minimum coverage provision addresses this fiscal burden by generating annual 
revenue of more than $4 billion, CBO, “Payments of Penalties for Being 
Uninsured Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” Apr. 30, 2010, 
at 3; and by encouraging individuals with income to purchase health insurance for 
themselves and their families.  Covered individuals have the choice to either 
purchase minimum essential coverage or pay a tax – promoting the PPACA’s 
fiscal goals without requiring those who purchase coverage to pay twice. 
1. The courts must “presume that Congress acts consistent with its duty 
to uphold the Constitution,” National Mining Ass’n v. Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702, 
711 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and are “duty bound to construe a statute so as to sustain it, if 
that is possible,” Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1938).  Thus, when the 
constitutionality of a congressional act is questioned, “th[e] Court will first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the 
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question may be avoided.”  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (citation 
omitted). 
Ignoring these principles, Plaintiffs read the minimum coverage provision’s 
sub-sections separately, arguing that §5000A(a), the so-called “individual 
mandate,” is a “regulatory provision” that, standing alone, cannot be an exercise of 
the taxing power.  Plaintiffs then construe §5000A(b)(1) as a regulatory penalty 
that “exists solely to further the individual mandate.”  R21 at 32-33.   
This exact approach was rejected by the Supreme Court in New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  The statute at issue there provided that the 
States “shall be responsible for providing . . . for the disposal of . . . radioactive 
waste,” id. at 169-70 (citation omitted), and was challenged as an impermissible 
“direct command” on the States.  The Court rejected the challenge, holding that the 
“mandate” could not be analyzed on its own but instead had to be read together 
with subsequent sections creating “incentives” for compliance.  So read, the 
“mandate” afforded the States “choices,” rather than imposing an impermissible 
“command” upon the States.  Id.   
The minimum coverage provision is no different.  Its “mandate” must be 
analyzed together with the tax-based mechanism through which Congress 
encouraged minimum coverage.  Properly viewed as a whole, the minimum 
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coverage provision is a valid taxing measure that affords individuals the choice of 
either meeting a prescribed condition or paying a modest tax.  See Thomas More 
Law Center v. Obama, No. 10-2388 (“TMLC”), at *48 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) 
(Sutton, J., concurring) (explaining that the PPACA “does not compel individuals 
to buy insurance”). 
2. As Plaintiffs acknowledge, R21 at 31, a monetary exaction’s 
constitutionality is determined by its “practical impact, not [its] name tag.”  
Jefferson Cty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 439-42 (1999) (ordinance “declar[ing] it 
‘unlawful . . . to engage in’ a covered occupation . . . without paying [a] license 
fee” established “income tax”); see also Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 
301 U.S. 495, 508 (1937); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 27 
(1910); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. at 470-71.  Courts must look past “the formal 
language of the tax statute [to] its practical effect.”  Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. 
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 275-79 (1977).    
In its practical operation, the minimum coverage provision is an income tax. 
First, payment of the tax is conditioned upon receipt of income.  See Acker, 
527 U.S. at 437-39 (exaction is income tax for purposes of Buck Act if “‘levied on, 
with respect to, or measured by, net income, gross income, or gross receipts’”) 
(citing 4 U.S.C. §110(c)).  Only individuals who receive income in excess of the 
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filing threshold are subject to the tax.  26 U.S.C. §5000A(e)(2).  Plaintiffs’ 
assertion that the tax “applies to all individuals simply because they exist,” R21 at 
35, is simply wrong. 
Second, the amount paid is always a small fraction of a taxpayer’s annual 
income.1  Thus, no sources of wealth other than income are taxed.  Indeed, many 
individuals with moderate incomes will be exempted from the tax.  See, e.g., 26 
U.S.C. §5000A(e)(1) (affordability exemption). 
Third, the tax is “measured” as a percentage of income, subject to a floor 
and ceiling (with both always far below total income), and remains an income tax 
notwithstanding its ceiling and floor.  The Social Security tax is similarly capped, 
see 26 U.S.C. §3121(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. §430; and the “alternative minimum tax,” 26 
U.S.C. §55, similarly ensures that taxpayers pay a minimum amount of federal 
income tax overall.2 
                                                        
 
1 In 2016, for example, the payment by a taxpayer without coverage cannot be 
greater than (1) 2.5% of household income above the filing threshold, or (2) a flat 
dollar amount ranging from $695 to $2085, depending on family size.  26 U.S.C. 
§5000A(c)(2)-(3).  The tax will always be a small portion of total income under 
either method.   
2 The payment will be calculated as a percentage of income for individuals with a 
broad range of incomes, e.g., from less than $40,000 to more than $200,000 in 
2016 (for single individuals).  This range includes, on the low end, the income at 
which 2.5% of household income over the filing threshold exceeds the flat 
(continued) 
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Fourth, the tax is collected entirely through the income tax system and its 
self-reporting mechanisms.  26 U.S.C. §5000A(b)(2).  Payments must be “assessed 
and collected in the same manner as taxes,” and are included by law in “any 
reference in [the Internal Revenue Code] to ‘tax.’”  Id. §§5000A(g)(1), 6671(a).  
The PPACA also treats family relationships in the same manner as the general 
income tax code.  Id. §5000A(b)(3) (individuals liable for payments required by 
dependents or spouse); id. §5000A(c)(4) (household income and family size 
defined by dependents reported on income tax return) (citing 26 U.S.C. §151).  
These features further demonstrate that the minimum coverage provision operates 
– and will be understood – as an income tax.3 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(continued) 
payment amount, and, on the high end, the income at which that same percentage 
exceeds an estimated average premium of $5,000 for individual coverage.  If the 
average premium in 2016 is higher, the upper level will be greater.  Because 2016 
filing thresholds are not available, we use 2010 filing thresholds. 
3 Plaintiffs assert that the minimum coverage provision cannot be an income tax 
because income is not the sole factor that determines its applicability and amount.  
R21 at 35 n.18.  This has never been the legal test.  But in any case, some of the 
very factors that, in Plaintiffs’ view, make the tax a non-income tax – such as “the 
number of people within the taxpayer’s household” – also determine the amount of 
a taxpayer’s general federal income tax.  26 U.S.C. §151.  And, because income 
taxes and other excise taxes are subject to the same constitutional requirements, the 
minimum coverage provision is constitutional even if it is construed as a form of 
excise tax other than an income tax. 
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3. Plaintiffs wrongly contend that the minimum coverage provision 
cannot be an exercise of the taxing power because Congress made Commerce 
Clause findings but “d[id] not mention the tax power.”  R21 at 29-30.  There is no 
requirement that Congress expressly invoke its taxing power and, unlike with the 
Commerce Clause, the courts have never required congressional “findings” 
regarding exercises of the taxing power.  “[T]he constitutionality of action taken by 
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to 
exercise.”  Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948).  “[The 
Court’s] duty in passing on the constitutionality of legislation is to determine 
whether Congress had the authority to adopt legislation, not whether it correctly 
guessed the source of that power.”  Usery v. Charleston Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d 1169, 
1171 (4th Cir. 1977).   
Further, while mere labels cannot determine whether Congress had the 
constitutional capacity to pass the PPACA, the assertion here (relevant or not) that 
Congress had no intent to tax is simply wrong.  Congress in fact expressly enacted 
the PPACA and the minimum coverage provision for revenue purposes.  See, e.g., 
PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1563(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 270 (2010) (“[T]his Act 
will reduce the Federal deficit . . . .”); Letter from CBO to Chairman Baucus (Sept. 
16, 2009) (estimating revenues generated by “penalty”); Joint Committee on 
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Taxation, JCX-43-09 (Oct. 29, 2009) (estimating revenue effects of “revenue 
provisions” including “Tax on Individual Without Acceptable Health Care 
Coverage”).  Congress may exercise its regulatory and taxation powers 
simultaneously.  See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414, 428 (1940) 
(finding import duty exercise of both taxing power and power to regulate foreign 
commerce); Hampton, 276 U.S. at 412; infra Section I.5. 
Further, many in Congress recognized this as a tax.  Proponents expressly 
invoked Congress’ taxing power.  See, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. S13581 (Dec. 20, 
2009) (Sen. Baucus); 155 Cong. Rec. S13751-52 (Dec. 22, 2009) (Sen. Leahy); 
156 Cong. Rec. H1882 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Miller); 156 Cong. Rec. H1826 
(Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Slaughter).  Others described the measure as a tax.  See, e.g., 
H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. 1, at 265 (2010) (discussing “tax on individuals who 
opt not to purchase health insurance”); 156 Cong. Rec. E506 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. 
Waxman) (“The individual responsibility requirement requires individuals to pay a 
tax on their individual tax filings . . . .”); 155 Cong. Rec. S10877 (Oct. 29, 2009) 
(Sen. Hatch) (“Some may say this is simply a penalty for not doing what Uncle 
Sam wants you to do, but let us face it, it is nothing more than a new tax.”).  And, 
the label “penalty” is consistent with Congress’ intent to tax:  Throughout the 
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legislative record, Congress used terms like “tax,” “assessable payment,” 
“assessable penalty,” “tax penalty,” and “penalty” interchangeably.4      
4. The court below correctly acknowledged that it “must first consider 
whether §5000A(b), which uses the term ‘penalty,’ operates as a tax.”  R39 at 56.  
Nonetheless, instead of examining its operation, the court focused exclusively on 
its label, and insisted that the provision’s “penalty” label precluded a finding that 
the assessment is a tax.  R39 at 56-59; see also TMLC at *29-*30.  Yet years of 
precedent teach that a monetary exaction’s constitutionality is determined by its 
“practical effect,” rather than by its name tag, and that “magic words or labels” 
cannot “disable an otherwise constitutional levy.”  Quill, 504 U.S. at 310 (citation 
                                                        
 
4 See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 55-56 (citing materials); 156 Cong. Rec. H1917 
(Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Kirk) (“Among the new taxes is a new ‘Individual Mandate 
Tax. . . .’”); 155 Cong. Rec. S12768 (Dec. 9, 2009) (Sen. Grassley) (“The . . . 
individual mandate penalty . . . . can be called a penalty, but it is a tax.”); 155 
Cong. Rec. S11454 (Nov.18, 2009) (Sen. McCain) (“Taxes on individuals who fail 
to maintain government-approved health insurance coverage will pay $4 billion in 
new penalties . . . .”); 155 Cong. Rec. H12576 (Nov. 6, 2009) (Rep. Franks) (“It 
would impose a 2.5 percent penalty tax on those who do not acquire healthcare 
insurance.”); 155 Cong. Rec. S11143 (Nov. 5, 2009) (Sen. Johanns) (discussing 
“penalty tax on individuals without insurance”); 155 Cong. Rec. S10746 (Oct. 27, 
2009) (Sen. Enzi) (“Most young people will probably do the math and decide . . . I 
can pay the $750-a year tax penalty rather than pay $5,000 a year more for health 
insurance.”); 155 Cong. Rec. S8644 (Aug. 3, 2009) (Sen. Kyl) (“There would be a 
penalty if they refused to [buy health insurance] that would go directly to their 
income tax.”). 
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omitted); Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 285 (rejecting “rule[s] of draftsmanship” that 
“distract the courts and parties from their inquiry into whether the challenged 
[provision] produced [unconstitutional] results”); Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. C.I.R., 
277 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1960) (“It is not necessary to uphold the validity of [a] tax 
imposed by the United States that the tax itself bear an accurate label”); In re 
Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Leckie”) (Congress 
exercised taxing power in requiring mine operators to pay insurance “premiums”).   
Indeed, under unquestioned Supreme Court precedents dating back well over 
a century, a monetary exaction may be an exercise of the taxing power even if 
Congress gives it a label that is unambiguously regulatory.  In 1866, the License 
Tax Cases recognized that a fee imposed on gambling and liquor businesses was a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’ taxing power even though Congress labeled 
the fee a “license,” 72 U.S. at 471; it worded the “license” requirement as a 
prohibition on unlicensed activity, id. at 468-69; legislatures generally use 
“licenses” to regulate, id. at 470-71; and the “license” requirement discouraged 
businesses widely considered to be immoral, id. at 473.  See also Acker, 527 U.S. 
at 439-42. 
Of course, “penalty” is far more consistent with the characterization of an 
assessment as a tax than “license.”  Congress explicitly required that this “penalty” 
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be construed as a tax for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, see 26 U.S.C. 
§§5000A(g)(1), 6671(a); and has long used the term “penalty” when referring to 
taxes.   E.g., Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107–16, §§301-303; 26 U.S.C. §1(f) (repeatedly referring to the income-tax 
differential paid by certain married couples as the “marriage penalty”).  Indeed, the 
use of “penalty” to describe a “tax” is common among courts, lawyers, and 
economists.5   
Moreover, as noted above, at all stages of the PPACA’s consideration, 
legislators referred to the minimum coverage provision as a “tax” and used the 
terms “tax” and “penalty” interchangeably.6  To strike down major legislation 
because Congress used the word “penalty” rather than “tax” would ignore the 
statute’s actual operation, the understandings of many in Congress, the relevant 
                                                        
 
5 E.g., Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 327 (2005) (describing tax on early 
withdrawals from IRA accounts as “tax penalty”); United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 
268, 275 (1978) (funds labeled “penalty” by Congress retained “essential character 
as taxes”); Hemingway v. United States, 81 F.Supp.2d 1163, 1164 (D. Utah 1999) 
(describing tax on “golden parachute payments” as “tax penalty”); Dan Dhaliwal, 
Oliver Zhen Li, Robert Trezevant, Is a Dividend Tax Penalty Incorporated into the 
Return on a Firm’s Common Stock?, 35 Journal of Accounting and Economics 155 
(2003). 
6 Supra Section I.3.   
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precedent on the tax authority, and the Court’s duty to uphold statutes that are, in 
substance, entirely constitutional.  
5.   It is similarly irrelevant whether Congress was in some sense 
“motivated” by regulatory goals.  Sozinsky, 300 U.S. at 513-14.  Congress may 
exercise its taxing power for regulatory purposes, including to deter or promote 
particular activities.  Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44 (“It is beyond serious question that a 
tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even 
definitely deters the activities taxed.”); Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 782 (discussing 
“mixed-motive taxes that governments impose both to deter a disfavored activity 
and to raise money”); Hampton, 276 U.S. at 412 (“[O]ther motives in the selection 
of the subjects of taxes cannot invalidate congressional action.”). 
Indeed, a revenue raising measure can be a valid exercise of the taxing 
power even if Congress’ primary purpose is regulatory.  See, e.g., Sanchez, 340 
U.S. at 44 (“[T]he revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary.”).  Hampton, for 
example, held that a protectionist tariff expressly enacted “to regulate the foreign 
commerce” was a valid exercise of Congress’ taxing power.  276 U.S. at 401.  The 
Court noted that the first Congress imposed tariffs for protectionist purposes, and 
emphatically rejected the argument “that it is unconstitutional to frame [monetary 
exactions] with any other view than that of revenue raising.”  Id. at 411-12.  The 
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text and history here demonstrate that the minimum coverage provision was 
intended to, and will in fact, generate significant revenue.  See supra Section I.3.  
That is enough. 
Moreover, the revenue and regulatory purposes here are interrelated: 
Congress’ goal of lessening the Treasury’s healthcare burden is served whether 
individuals choose to pay the tax or purchase essential coverage.  As the Supreme 
Court recognized in upholding a similarly structured tax system, an exaction does 
not lose its character as a tax simply because it can be avoided through an act that 
Congress wishes to encourage and that will itself reduce the nation’s fiscal burden.  
Steward, 301 U.S. at 590-592. 
6. Not all monetary exactions are taxes.  But as numerous cases – 
including Steward, Sanchez, and Hampton – demonstrate, the Supreme Court has 
“abandoned” the Lochner-era “distinction[] between regulatory and revenue-
raising taxes.”  Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974).  Instead, 
exactions with regulatory purposes or effects that lack uniquely “penalizing 
features” remain taxes enacted pursuant to Congress’ taxing authority.  Kurth 
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Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779.7  As Justice Holmes recognized, there is no “difference 
between being fined and being taxed a certain sum for doing a certain thing” in the 
absence of “some further disadvantages.”  Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. 
L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897).  Many taxes discourage (or induce) behavior that is 
subject to (or exempt from) the tax, but far more is needed to conclude that such a 
provision is not a tax.  United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953) (wagering 
tax not penalty “regardless of its regulatory effect”); Sonzinsky v. United States, 
300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (“Every tax is in some measure regulatory.”).   
Of course “there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features” of 
an exaction “when it loses its character” as a tax.  Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779.  
That is not the case here.  
First, the minimum coverage provision gives taxpayers the option of 
purchasing insurance or paying the tax.  Had Congress intended to ensure 
compliance with a regulatory “mandate,” it could have structured the “penalty” so 
                                                        
 
7 The Sixth Circuit cited Kurth Ranch in claiming that the distinction “retains force 
today.”  TMLC at *33-*34.  To the contrary, Kurth Ranch cautioned “against 
invalidating” a monetary exaction because “oppressive or because the legislature’s 
motive was somehow suspect,” for both taxes and penalties “deter certain 
behavior.”  Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 778-79 (emphasis added).  Kurth Ranch 
simply recognized that “the extension of the penalizing features” of a monetary 
exaction may eventually cause it to “lose[] its character” as a tax.  Id. at 779.  The 
minimum coverage provision does not operate in this manner.  Infra Section I.6. 
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that payment would not relieve individuals of the underlying obligation.  Cf. 
United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, 518 U.S. 213, 225-226 
(1996). 
Second, the amount of the tax is at most the approximate equivalent of the 
cost of insurance, not an excessively “high rate” “consistent with a punitive 
character.”  Cf. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780 (punitive drug tax was eight times 
drug’s market value).  Congress’ non-punitive approach is evident in the modest 
overall amount of the tax, which is pro-rated if the taxpayer obtains insurance for 
part of the tax year.  See 26 U.S.C. §5000A(b); cf. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 
259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922), entitled “The Child Labor Tax Case” (improper “penalty” 
not pro-rated). 
Third, payment of the tax is not conditioned on illegal conduct.  Cf. Kurth 
Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781-82 (conditioning tax on crime “is ‘significant of penal and 
prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue’”) (quoting United States v. 
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935)).  Indeed, one faces no consequence other 
than the tax for opting not to purchase insurance; the PPACA specifically bars the 
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government from resorting to criminal prosecution, penalties, liens, or levies for 
failure to pay the tax.  Id. §5000A(g)(2).8   
Finally, the minimum coverage provision is located in the Internal Revenue 
Code, collected through the tax system, and enforced by the tax authorities, 
evidencing an exercise of the taxing power.  See Leckie, 99 F.3d at 583 n.12; cf. 
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 35 (noting that improper “penalty” was 
enforced by Secretary of Labor). 
Because the minimum coverage provision operates as an income tax and has 
no “penalizing features,” it is an income tax for constitutional purposes. 
II. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Within Congress’ Plenary Power 
To Tax Income 
As an income tax, the minimum coverage provision is well within Congress’ 
taxing power.  The Constitution affords Congress broad and comprehensive power 
to tax, independent of the other enumerated congressional powers, and subject only 
to narrow limitations.  See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936); Pacific 
                                                        
 
8 That Congress took pains to make enforcement less punitive than other taxes 
demonstrates that, here, there has been no “extension of the penalizing features” 
that might take the exaction outside of Congress’ taxing authority.  Kurth Ranch, 
511 U.S. at 779.  Nor does Congress’ reliance on less intrusive collection measures 
undermine the conclusion that this is a tax.  See Acker, 527 U.S. at 440-41 
(exaction was income tax where enforcement was limited to suit for collection).  
The Sixth Circuit’s contrary reasoning, TMLC at *32, was error. 
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Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 443-46 (1868); Hylton v. United States, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796) (Chase, J.) (“A general power is given to Congress, 
to lay and collect taxes, of every kind or nature, without any restraint, except only 
on exports.”).  Congress’ power to tax income is especially broad.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936) (“When it is 
[income], it may be taxed . . . .”). 
A. The Constitution’s Taxation Provisions 
“The great object of the Constitution was, to give Congress a power to lay 
taxes, adequate to the exigencies of government. . . .”  Hylton, 3 U.S. at 173.  
“[N]othing is clearer, from the discussions in the Convention and the discussions 
which preceded final ratification by the necessary number of States, than the 
purpose to give this power to Congress, as to the taxation of everything except 
exports, in its fullest extent.”  Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 540 
(1869).  This “complete and all-embracing taxing power” “is exhaustive and 
embraces every conceivable power of taxation.”  Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12-13.   
The power is subject to meaningful but narrow limitations, none of which 
apply here. 
1. An exercise of Congress’ taxation power must produce “some 
revenue.”  Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514; United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94 
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(1919) (requiring “relation to the raising of revenue”).  The minimum coverage 
provision easily satisfies this requirement.  The PPACA was prompted in part by 
Congress’ concern about the fiscal strain of rising healthcare costs, and the 
minimum coverage provision will generate $4 billion in revenue, far exceeding the 
revenue generated by other valid taxes.  Cf. Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28 n.4 (noting 
valid taxes generating $3,501 and $28,911). 
2. Congress must use its taxation power to promote the “general 
welfare.”  U.S. Const., art. I, §8.  The scope of the “general welfare” “is quite 
expansive.”  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976).  The discretion to determine 
whether a tax serves the general welfare “belongs to Congress, unless the choice is 
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.”  
Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640. 
The minimum coverage tax is part of a programmatic response to the 
significant national problems caused by the number of Americans without 
adequate health insurance.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2).  This readily satisfies 
the general welfare requirement. 
3. The Constitution imposes two additional limits on the means by which 
Congress taxes: “direct taxes, including the capitation tax, shall be apportioned; 
[and] duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform.”  Soule, 74 U.S. at 446.  
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Plaintiffs assert that the minimum coverage provision, if a tax, is a direct tax 
requiring apportionment.  This characterization is simply wrong.  Supra Section 
I.2.  But in any case, in taxing income, Congress acts with the specific 
authorization of the Sixteenth Amendment, which gives Congress “power to lay 
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without 
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration.”  U.S. Const. amend. XVI (emphasis added).  The Amendment 
grants Congress plenary authority to tax any “accessions to wealth, clearly 
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”  C.I.R. v. 
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).  Although Congress may not use 
this power to pass taxes that plainly operate as property taxes requiring 
apportionment, see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920), the Supreme 
Court has emphasized the narrowness of this holding, Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 
430-31, and recognized that “income” should be construed liberally, see 
Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 521 (1921). 
Under the Sixteenth Amendment, income taxes need only be uniform.  
Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18-19.  A tax satisfies this requirement if it exhibits no 
“undue preference” for certain states.  United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 86 
(1983).  The minimum coverage tax readily satisfies this test because it applies the 
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same formula throughout the nation.  Although the affordability exemption is 
defined by the cost of health insurance in the State where a taxpayer resides, see 26 
U.S.C. §5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii), such a distinction based on neutral factors and 
exhibiting no intent to discriminate satisfies the uniformity requirement.  
Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 74-86 (tax exemption for “Alaskan oil” consistent with 
uniformity requirement because reflected “climactic and geographic conditions”). 
4. Finally, an exercise of Congress’ plenary taxation power must not 
offend the Constitution’s individual rights provisions, by violating, for instance, 
constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy or self-incrimination.  See Kurth 
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767; Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).  There is no 
reasonable argument that the minimum coverage provision offends any provision 
of the Bill of Rights.9 
B. Plaintiffs Rely Upon Discredited Restrictions On The Taxing Power 
Both Plaintiffs and the Sixth Circuit rely on discredited Lochner-era cases – 
specifically, Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922); and Butler, 297 U.S. 1 
(1936) – to contend that a tax’s regulatory purpose can take it outside the scope of 
                                                        
 
9 The provision also has no “penalizing features” that would preclude its 
characterization as a tax.  Supra Section I.6. 
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Congress’ taxing power.  See R21 at 32-33 & n.17; TMLC at *33.  This reliance is 
both revealing and misplaced. 
First, both cases involved exactions with numerous penalizing features, 
absent here, that demonstrated their regulatory nature.  This is the point for which 
the two cases are occasionally cited.  See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 511 at 779; see also 
supra Part I.6 (noting that exaction at issue in Child Labor Tax Case was quite 
substantial, not pro-rated, and enforced by Labor Secretary); Steward, 301 U.S. at 
590-93 (limiting Butler and Child Labor Tax Case to their facts).   
Second, these cases cannot be reconciled with the many pre- and post-
Lochner era precedents establishing that federal taxes may be enacted for 
regulatory purposes, including to deter or encourage particular behaviors.  See 
supra Section I.5 (discussing Hampton, Sanchez, and License Tax Cases).   
Plaintiffs nonetheless suggest that Child Labor Tax Case and Butler prohibit 
Congress from using its taxing power to regulate that which (in Plaintiffs’ view) it 
cannot regulate directly.  R21 at 32-33.  But “[f]rom the beginning of our 
government, the courts have sustained taxes although imposed with the collateral 
intent of effecting ulterior ends which, considered apart, were beyond the 
constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation directly addressed 
to their accomplishment.”  Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 45 (quotation omitted, emphasis 
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added).  Courts have long held that Congress may impose conditional taxes or 
place conditions on the receipt of government funds to achieve “objectives not 
thought to be within Article I’s enumerated legislative fields.”  South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citation omitted) (collecting cases); see also 
Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (Congress cannot 
prohibit lobbying but can tax contributions to organizations that lobby while 
exempting contributions to those that do not).  Put simply, the taxing power 
“reaches every subject.”  License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. at 470-71.10      
The contrary decisions in both cases (and other similar cases of that era) 
turned on the thoroughly discredited view that the Tenth Amendment bars 
Congress from seeking to impact, directly or indirectly, areas of policy deemed 
“matters of state concern” and thus “within power reserved to the States” – even 
through otherwise valid exercises of its General Welfare Clause powers.  Compare 
                                                        
 
10 Because Congress’ taxing and spending power “is not limited by the direct 
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution,” Butler, 297 U.S. at 66, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly sustained taxes on intrastate activity, including in 
contexts (or during periods) where such activities were understood as beyond 
Congress’ other enumerated powers.  See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 
(1945) (“death tax”); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929) (gift tax); 
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (inheritance and legacy tax); Scholey v. 
Rew, 90 U.S. 331 (1874) (estate tax); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. at 470-71 (tax on 
intrastate lottery and liquor trades). 
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Butler, 297 U.S. at 69-70; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36; with, e.g., 
Fernandez, 326 U.S. at 362 (“The Tenth Amendment does not operate as a 
limitation upon the powers, express or implied, delegated to the national 
government.”).  The Tenth Amendment simply does not prohibit Congress from 
using its taxing and spending power to create financial incentives for conduct that 
Congress has determined serves the general welfare.  New York, 505 U.S. at 166-
67, 171-73. 
C. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Constitutionally 
Indistinguishable from the Social Security Act 
 
In fact, the Supreme Court has directly rejected the claim that Child Labor 
Tax Case and Butler prohibit Congress from exercising its taxing authority to 
increase participation in insurance programs meeting minimum national standards.  
From the perspective of Congress’ taxation authority, the minimum coverage tax is 
no different from the unemployment and old age insurance taxes Congress 
established through the Social Security Act.  See Helvering, 301 U.S. 619; 
Steward, 301 U.S. 548.  The constitutional propriety of that exercise of Congress’ 
taxation power is beyond dispute; there is no substantive basis to treat this income 
tax any differently. 
1. The Social Security Act established comprehensive insurance 
programs to address the financial insecurity stemming from economic 
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retrenchment and “old age.”  Helvering, 301 U.S. at 641.  To fund the “Federal 
Old-Age Benefits,” Congress “la[id] two different types of tax, an ‘income tax on 
employees,’ and ‘an excise tax on employers.’”  Id. at 635-36.  To promote the 
development of unemployment insurance programs, Congress paired its tax on 
employers with a credit for those who contributed to state insurance funds that 
satisfied certain criteria.  Steward, 301 U.S. at 574. 
In Helvering and Steward, the Supreme Court rejected constitutional 
challenges to these provisions.  Helvering rejected claims that the tax on employers 
“was not an excise as excises were understood when the Constitution was adopted” 
and that the Act was “an invasion of powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment to 
the states or to the people.”  301 U.S. at 638.  Steward rejected the argument that 
Congress’ tax and credit system was a regulatory mandate on employers to make 
particular insurance contributions and on states to create particular programs, such 
that the “so-called tax was not a true one.”  301 U.S. at 592.  Steward concluded 
that the conditional tax credit was a reasonable way to structure a tax, as it 
“promoted . . . relief through local units” while “in all fairness” ensuring that 
employers making contributions that helped alleviate the problem would not “pay a 
second time.”  Id. at 589.   
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Taxpayers have continued to resist payment of the taxes by complaining 
(like opponents of the PPACA) that Congress cannot use its taxing power to 
establish “compulsory benefits” that they do not want or will not use.  Those 
claims, however, have been universally rejected.  See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 
455 U.S. 252 (1982); Carmichael, 301 U.S. at 521, 525 (“It is irrelevant . . . that 
some pay the tax who have not occasioned its expenditure, or that in the course of 
the use of its proceeds . . . the legislature has benefited individuals, who may or 
may not be related to those who are taxed.”). 
2. Instead of mandating participation in a single national insurance 
program, or taxing everyone and then providing a credit to those with insurance, 
the PPACA gives taxpayers the choice of purchasing adequate insurance or paying 
a tax.  This approach generates general revenue and provides an incentive for 
taxpayers to purchase health insurance, while imposing no additional obligations 
upon those who have purchased coverage. 
This minor difference from the Social Security Act in form does not render 
the PPACA’s conditional tax unconstitutional.  Payment of the minimum coverage 
tax is, as in Steward, “dependent upon the conduct of the taxpayers.”  301 U.S. at 
591.  Steward established that Congress may use its taxing power to stimulate 
activity, including the purchase of insurance, where the failure to act contributes to 
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a costly national problem.  Id.  Steward recognized that many states, to avoid 
occupying “a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or 
competitors,” would not independently enact unemployment compensation 
programs.  Id. at 588.  The Social Security Act addressed this problem through a 
tax that generated revenues “used and needed by the nation as long as states [were] 
unwilling . . . to do what can be done at home,” while “crediting the taxpayer . . . to 
the extent that his contributions [to a state program] . . . simplified or diminished 
the problem of relief and the probable demand upon the resources of the fisc.”  Id. 
at 588-89. 
The minimum coverage provision is indistinguishable, in substance and 
effect, from the conditional tax in Steward.  Providing healthcare to the uninsured 
imposes an immense burden on the state and federal fiscs.  E.g., H.R. Rep. No. 
111-443, pt. 2, at 983 (2010) (“In 2008, total government spending to reimburse 
uncompensated care costs . . . was approximately $42.9 billion.”).  Most states 
have not gone beyond providing care to the indigent, children, and elderly – 
leaving many Americans with no health coverage.  Meanwhile, employer-provided 
health benefits are declining because of the rising costs of healthcare.  High 
Healthcare Costs: A State Perspective: Hearing Before S. Comm. On Finance, 
110th Cong. S2 (2008) (Sarah Collins, The Commonwealth Fund).  Many 
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individuals who wish to purchase insurance cannot do so.  155 Cong. Rec. S13568-
69 (Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen. Baucus).  Now, as in 1935, Congress has “many reasons – 
fiscal and economic as well as social and moral – for planning to mitigate disasters 
that bring these burdens in their train.”  Steward, 301 U.S. at 587.   
The PPACA addresses the obstacles to comprehensive health insurance 
coverage, in part by barring practices (such as denying coverage for pre-existing 
conditions) that make affordable coverage unavailable to many, and in part by 
providing tax incentives for individuals to purchase insurance.  Here, no less than 
with Social Security, “[t]he purpose of [Congress’] intervention . . . is to safeguard 
its own treasury and as an incident to that protection to place the [taxpayers] upon 
a footing of equal opportunity.  Drains upon its own resources are to be checked; 
obstructions to the freedom of the [taxpayers] are to be leveled.”  Id. at 590-91.  By 
giving taxpayers the choice to purchase insurance or pay a tax that is at most the 
“approximate equivalent[],” id. at 591, the minimum coverage provision is 
designed, like the Social Security Act, to prevent taxpayers who have otherwise 
paid for coverage from having “to pay a second time.”  Id. at 589. 
It is meaningless formalism to argue that Congress could have passed the 
minimum coverage provision as an increased income tax on all taxpayers 
accompanied by a credit for those with qualifying health insurance, but that it 
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could not adopt the more direct course of a conditional tax imposing the same net 
cost.  See, e.g., TMLC at *29.  The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected this 
approach to a tax’s constitutionality.  Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288 
(“[F]ormalism merely obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden 
effect.”).  Both methods afford the taxpayer the same choice with the same net tax 
effect.  See United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510, 517 (1942). 
The Constitution gives Congress the “useful and necessary right . . . to select 
. . . means” “which, in its judgment, would most advantageously effect the object 
to be accomplished.”  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 419 (1819).  Here, the 
means Congress chose – directly imposing an income tax upon those who have not 
purchased health insurance – is simpler and less administratively onerous than a 
functionally identical tax and credit system, especially since the majority of 
income earners already have health coverage.  Nothing in the Constitution requires 
Congress to refrain from using the most efficient means to accomplish its 
permitted ends.  See id. at 421 (Congress may use all “appropriate” and “plainly 
adapted” means). 
In substance and effect the minimum coverage provision is an income tax 
well within Congress’ enumerated powers.  Matters of mere form cannot render 
unconstitutional this proper exercise of the taxation power. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case. 
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